The paper studies dynamic information flow security policies in an automaton-based model. Two semantic interpretations of such policies are developed, both of which generalize the notion of TA-security [van der Meyden ESORICS 2007] for static intransitive noninterference policies. One of the interpretations focuses on information flows permitted by policy edges, the other focuses on prohibitions implied by absence of policy edges. In general, the two interpretations differ, but necessary and sufficient conditions are identified for the two interpretations to be equivalent. Sound and complete proof techniques are developed for both interpretations. Two applications of the theory are presented. The first is a general result showing that access control mechanisms are able to enforce a dynamic information flow policy. The second is a simple capability system motivated by the Flume operating system.
Introduction
Covert channels, i.e., avenues for information flow unintended by the designers of a system, present a significant risk for systems that are required to enforce confidentiality, since they constitute vulnerabilities that an attacker may exploit in order to exfiltrate secrets. This has motivated a body of research that aims to provide means by which systems can be assured to be free of covert channels. At the highest levels of assurance, one aims for formal verification based on rigorous models of the system. This requires formal definitions of what it means for a system to comply with a policy that specifies the intended information flows, and prohibits the unintended information flows.
How to give a formal semantics to such policies that is suitable for formal verification has been a topic of study since the 1970s [Coh77] . Noninterference policies [GM82] are a form of policy syntax in the form of a graph over a set of security levels, or domains, with an edge representing that information is permitted to flow from the source of the edge to the destination. Conversely, absence of an edge can be understood as prohibiting (direct) information flow. In the original formulation of such policies, corresponding to classical multi-level security policies based on a lattice of security levels, the graph was transitive, but there has more recently been a body of work on intransitive noninterference policies, which do not require transitivity. Here, a domain is best understood as a component within a security architecture, with edges describing permitted direct flows of information, and paths corresponding to permitted indirect flows of information. In particular, this understanding underlies MILS security [BDRS08, VBC + 05], an approach to high assurance systems development in which security architectures comprised of trusted and untrusted components are enforced using a variety of mechanisms including separation kernels. At its most abstract level, the architecture can be understood as an intransitive noninterference policy. Several large-scale efforts [BQIR14, HALM06, MWTG00, MMB + 12, SRS + 02] have formally verified that intransitive noninterference policies hold in a number of separation kernels.
The proper semantics of intransitive noninterference policies has proved to be a subtle matter. Rushby [Rus92] improved an initial proposal by Haigh and Young [HY87] , giving semantics to policies by means of an intransitive purge function. Van der Meyden [vdM15] has recently argued that there is a subtle weakness in this intransitive purge based semantics. He provides an example that demonstrates that this semantics may classify as secure a system that contains flows of information, based on the ordering of events, that seem to contradict an intuitive understanding of the policy. He proposes an alternative, stronger, definition of security, TA-security, that correctly classifies this example as insecure. (The nomenclature "TA" derives from the intuition that this definition is based on a model of transmission of information about actions.) Moreover, TA-security is shown to provide a better fit for Rushby's proof theory. Rushby shows that this proof theory is sound for his definition, but fails to provide a completeness result. Van der Meyden explains this, by showing that it is both sound and complete for the stronger notion of TA-security. This completeness result is obtained both for Rushby's unwinding proof method and for a variant of Rushby's results demonstrating that access control systems provide a sound method for enforcement of intransitive noninterference policies.
This line of work has concerned static policies, in which the permitted flows of information do not change over time. Such policies are too restrictive for many practical purposes: the permitted flows of information in a system could change as a result of policy changes, system reconfiguration, in response to detection of vulnerabilities or attacks in progress, as a result of personnel changes, promotions, revocations of privileges, delegations, transfers of capabilities, and for many other reasons.
A full understanding of the formal underpinnings of security architecture should accommodate such dynamic policy changes, and it is therefore of interest to have a satisfactory theory of dynamic intransitive noninterference policies. To date, only a few works have studied this question: Leslie [Les06] and Eggert et. al. [ESW13] . Both are based on generalizations of Rushby's "intransitive purge" operator and, in the case of static policies, are equivalent to Rushby's semantics. Consequently, these works are subject to the weakness of this semantics identified by van der Meyden. In particular, they misclassify van der Meyden's example. Leslie provides an unwinding proof theory for her definition that is equivalent to Rushby's unwinding in the static case, hence is incomplete. Eggert et. al. do provide a complete proof theory and a complexity characterization for their definition.
Our main contribution in this paper is to develop alternate semantics for dynamic intransitive noninterference policies that generalize the more adequate notion of TA-security in the static case. Indeed, we show (in Sect. 3) that there are several candidates for such a semantics since, in the dynamic setting, it turns out that the information flows permitted by policy edges are not always the complement of the information flows prohibited by the absence of policy edges. This leads to two distinct semantics, one of which prioritizes the permissions and the other of which prioritizes the prohibitions. A further complexity to policy in the dynamic setting is the question of what knowledge the agents in the system are permitted to have of the state of the policy itself. However, this consideration is also helpful: we show that locality, a natural condition on agent knowledge of the policy, provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the permissive and the prohibitive interpretations of the policy to be equivalent. Reference to agent knowledge also enables us to characterize precisely the maximal information permitted to be known to each agent in the system at moment of time, in terms of a concrete representation of the information that may have been transmitted to the agent. We show by some examples that our definitions improve on those of Leslie [Les06] and Eggert et. al. [ESW13] , not just in the treatment of static policies (van der Meyden's example justifying TA-security), but also in the classification of some simple dynamic policies.
We then (in Sect. 4) develop proof methods that may be used to show that a system is secure, with a focus on local policies, so that the technique applies to both of our definitions of security. We first generalize the classical unwinding proof method [GM84] to our new definitions. This is used (in Sect. 5) to generalize, to a dynamic setting, Rushby's [Rus92] results on enforcement of a static intransitive noninterference policy by means of access control settings. In both cases, we demonstrate not just soundness but also completeness of the proof method.
Static policies
A static policy describes the permitted and prohibited flows of information between domains. Formally, a static policy for the signature D, dom, A is a reflexive binary relation (possibly intransitive) on the set of domains D. Intuitively, u v means that information is permitted to flow from domain u to domain v , and conversely, u v means that information flows from domain u to domain v are prohibited. Policies are assumed to be reflexive because, intuitively, nothing can be done to prevent information flowing from a domain to itself, so this is allowed by default. Since can be taken to be the edge set of a directed graph with vertex set D, we may use terminology from graph theory when we describe properties of a policy. For example, we may call u v an "edge" of the policy , and talk about "paths" in the relation . We remark that the system model introduced above appears to lack a notion of internal (silent) transitions, but these can be handled by adding a systems domain Sys, such that each internal transition corresponds to some action of domain Sys. This representation also requires adding an edge Sys u to the policy for all other domains u.
A significant body of work already exists in relation to static policies, e.g., [GM82, Rus92, vdM15, RG99] . Since our focus in this paper is to find semantics for dynamic policies that generalizes the semantics of van der Meyden [vdM15] for static intransitive noninterference policies, we reiterate here just that semantics in order to motivate what follows, and refer the reader to the literature for more detailed discussion. The semantics involves for each agent u a function ta u from the set of traces, such that for a trace α, the value ta u (α) intuitively represents a concrete encoding of the maximal amount of information that the agent is permitted to have about α. The function ta u transforms a trace α into a binary tree, which contains less information about the order of the actions than the trace does. This function is defined inductively by 1 ta u ( ) and for every α ∈ A * and a ∈ A by ta u (αa) (ta u (α), ta dom(a) (α), a) if dom(a) u ta u (α) otherwise .
Intuitively, in case dom(a) u, information from dom(a) is not permitted to flow to u, so the occurrence of the action a causes no change in the maximal information ta u (α) that may be possessed by u after α. However, if dom(a) u, then the occurrence of a after α causes the maximal information that agent u is permitted to have to increase, by adding to its prior information ta u (α) the maximal information ta dom(a) (α) that the agent performing a is permitted to have after α, as well as the fact that the action a has occurred. Using the functions ta u , we may now declare a system to be secure, in the sense of complying with the information flow policy , as follows: Definition 1 A system M is TA-secure with respect to policy , if for all agents u and α, β ∈ A * , if ta u (α) ta u (β) then obs u (s 0 · α) obs u (s 0 · β).
Intuitively, this says that for all agents u, the observation obs u (s 0 · α) contains no more information than the maximal permitted information ta u (α).
Dynamic policies
Our main concern in this paper is with dynamic intransitive information flow policies, which generalize static policies by allowing the edges of the policy to depend on the actions that have been performed in the system. Formally, a dynamic policy is a relation ⊆ D × A * × D, such that (u, α, u) ∈ for all α ∈ A * and all u ∈ D. We write α | u v when (u, α, v ) ∈ . Intuitively, α | u v says that, after the sequence of actions α have been performed, information may flow from domain u to domain v . Thus, α {(u, v ) | (u, α, v ) ∈ } is the (static) policy that applies after the actions α have been performed.
Dynamic policies can be represented using automata. We say that a tuple P , consisting of an automaton P S , s 0 , → and a relation
(In this case we also write s | u v .) Every dynamic policy has such a representation (with an infinite number of states), since we may take S A * and → {(α, a, αa) | α ∈ A * , a ∈ A}. We may call the policy finite state if it has a representation with S finite and D and A are finite.
Let D, dom, A be a signature. A policy enhanced system for this signature is an automaton A S , s 0 , → that is equipped with a relation ⊆ D × S × D and an observation function obs with domain D × S . Given a system M and a dynamic policy for the signature, we say that the policy enhanced system A, , obs encodes M and if A, obs is bisimilar to M and A, represents . For every pair consisting of a system M and a dynamic policy for the same signature, we can construct a policy enhanced system that encodes M and . Given an automaton representation A P , of where A P S P , s P 0 , → P , and a system M
The automaton A M × A P may be equipped with an observation function obs with domain S and a policy relation
It is then straightforward to show that the policy enhanced system A M × A P , obs, encodes M and . It will often be convenient, in presenting examples, to use a diagram of a policy enhanced system in order to present the policy and the system together as a single automaton. Figure 1 gives an example of this presentation. We note the following conventions to be applied in interpreting these diagrams. States are represented by rectangles partitioned into three components. The top component gives the name of the state. The middle component depicts the static policy applicable at that state. The bottom component gives partial information about the observations that the agents make at the state: typically, only one agent's information is relevant to the discussion, and we elide the observations of the other agents in the system. The initial state is represented by a source-less arrow. State transitions caused by an action a are represented by a a-labelled directed edges. The systems represented are input-enabled, but we elide self loops corresponding to transitions of the form (s, a, s) in order to reduce clutter.
There is a natural order on policies. Consider the binary relation ≤ on policies with respect to a given signature D, dom, A , defined by ≤ iff for all α ∈ A * and u, v ∈ D, we have α | u v implies α | u v . It is easily seen that this relation partially orders the policies with respect to the signature. Intuitively, if ≤ then places more restrictions on the flow of information in a system than does . This intuition can be supported for both a permissive and a prohibitive reading of policies. On a permissive reading, ≤ intuitively says that every situation in which a flow of information is explicitly permitted by is one where the flow of information is explicitly permitted by . Thus, is more restrictive than in the sense of having fewer explicitly permitted flows of information. On a prohibitive reading, ≤ says (contrapositively) that every situation where explicitly prohibits a flow of information is one where also explicitly prohibits that flow of information. Thus, is more restrictive than in the sense of having more explicitly prohibited flows of information. We may therefore gloss ≤ as stating that is more restrictive than .
Logic of knowledge
It will be convenient to formulate some of our definitions using formulas from a logic of knowledge. Given a signature D, dom, A , we work with formulas φ expressed using the following grammar: where u, v ∈ D are domains and G ⊆ D is a set of domains. Intuitively, the atomic propositions of the logic are assertions of the form u v concerning the static policy holding at a particular point of time. We write Prop for the set of atomic propositions. The logic contains the usual boolean operators for conjunction and negation, and we freely use other boolean operators that can be defined using these, e.g., we write φ ⇒ ψ for ¬(φ ∧ ¬ψ). The formula K u φ intuitively says that domain u knows that φ holds, and D G φ says that it is distributed knowledge to the group G that φ holds, i.e., the group G would be able to deduce φ if they were to pool all the information held by the members of the group.
The semantics of the logic is a standard Kripke semantics for epistemic logic [FHMV95] : formulas are interpreted in Kripke structures K W , {∼ u } u∈D , | where W is a set, for each u ∈ D, we have an equivalence relation ∼ u on W , and | ⊆ W × Prop is a binary relation.
Intuitively, W is a set of worlds, representing possible situations in a system of interest. The equivalence relation ∼ u intuitively corresponds to indistinguishability of worlds to an agent: w ∼ u w will hold when agent u has the same information available to it when it is in situation w as it has in situation w . For a world w and an atomic proposition p, the relation w | p represents that the proposition p is true at the world w . We may also write this as K, w | p to make the structure K explicit. In turn, this relation can be extended to a satisfaction relation K, w | φ for arbitrary formulas, by means of the following recursion:
In our applications, we will work with the set of worlds W A * , i.e., worlds will be traces for the signature of interest. The basic relation w | p will be the relation α | u v from some dynamic policy for this signature. We discuss the equivalence relations we use later.
Semantics for dynamic policies
In the setting of dynamic policies, several subtle issues arise that a suitable definition of security needs to take into account.
One is that policies can be interpreted with a focus on positive or negative edges. One can read α | u v as stating a permission: in state α, actions of u may pass information from u to v (even if u or v does not know that α | u v ). Nothing about the policy or system may override this permission, and an agent cannot be sanctioned for having caused the information flow. Alternately, and more restrictively, one could focus on the converse: and treat α | u v as stating a prohibition: in state α, information may not flow from u to v . The interaction between various such prohibitions may have the effect that even where there is an edge α | u v , it is in fact prohibited for information to flow from u to v because of derived prohibitions. The following example suggests that these two readings of the policy may be in conflict.
Example 1 Consider the system in Fig. 1 . Intuitively, domain P is a policy authority that controls the policy between domains A and B by means of its action p, and a is an action of domain A.
This system displays a conflict in the transition from state s 1 to state s 2 , between the permissive reading of the edge A B and the prohibitive reading of the edge P B . On the one hand, according to a permissive reading of the policy, the fact that the action a causes a change in the observation in domain B is not an insecurity, because the policy explicitly permits a flow of information from domain A to B in state s 1 , and what B learns in state s 2 is that A has performed action a. On the other hand, in no state of the policy is there an edge from domain P to domain B . Even the union of all possible policy states does not contain a path from P to B . Thus, we expect from a prohibitive reading of the policy that there should be no flow of information from domain P to domain B . On this reading, the transition from s 1 to s 2 displays an insecurity in the system, since on making observation 1 domain B can deduce not just that action a has occurred, but also that it has been preceded by action p in domain P . Thus, the system contains a prohibited flow of information from P to B , and should be judged to be insecure. 2
There are several attitudes one can take in the face of such apparent conflicts within a policy. One is to allow explicit permissions to take precedence over prohibitions. Another is to require that prohibitions take precedence over permissions. Finally, we can restrict policies to instances that do not contain such conflicts. We will consider all these possibilities.
For static policies, it is safe to assume that the policy is known to all agents in the system: indeed, it can be assumed to be common knowledge. A second subtlety for dynamic policies is that the current policy state depends on past actions, and not all agents will be permitted to know the entire past. This implies that there may be situations where some agents do not have complete information about the current policy state. This causes difficulty for any agent that is required to enforce compliance with the policy. For example, in the policy of Example 1, agent A is never permitted to know whether P has performed action p, so cannot be relied upon to enforce a policy restriction on the transfer of information about its actions to agent B , as applies in the initial policy state, but not in state s 1 . We will approach this issue below by interpreting the policy in a way that takes into account what agents know about the policy state.
Permissive interpretation
We first formulate a definition that captures a permissive reading of a dynamic policy, while generalizing TAsecurity. The methodology underlying the notion of TA-security is to construct a concrete representation of the maximal information that each agent is permitted to have after each sequence of actions, and then to state that a system is secure if it has no more than that permitted information. For dynamic policies, with a permissive interpretation of edges α | u v , this leads to the following inductive definition of an operator ta 3 . It is defined for every domain u, trace α ∈ A * and action a ∈ A by ta 3 u ( ) and
We also obtain a derived equivalence relation ∼ 3
u states that it is permitted, after trace α, for dom(a) to send information to u, and dom(a) exercises this by sending to u all the information that it has (viz. ta 3 dom(a) (α)), as well as the fact that it is performing the action a. The agent u receives this information and appends it to the information that it already has (viz., ta 3 u (α).) In case α | dom(a) u, on the other hand, there is no transfer of information from dom(a) to u, since the policy does not permit this.
If we take ta 3 as a formalization of the maximal information permitted to an agent, we get the following definition of security, in the same pattern as TA-security. Definition 2 A system M is ta 3 -secure with respect to a policy if for all domains u and sequences of actions α, β, if ta 3 u (α) ta 3 u (β) then obs u (s 0 · α) obs u (s 0 · β). The following example shows that ta 3 -security takes a permissive interpretation of Example 1.
Example 2 Treating the diagram of Fig. 1 as a definition of the policy, we obtain that for any sequence α of the form a * or a * p, we have ta 3 B (α) . On the other hand ta 3 B (pa) ( , , a), so every sequence β such that ta 3 B (pa) ta 3 B (β) has the property that it contains a p followed later by an a. Thus, if we interpret ta 3 B (pa) as a concrete representation of what B is allowed to know after the sequence pa, we conclude that B is permitted to know that there has been an occurrence of action p. Indeed, for any sequence β with ta 3 B (pa) ta 3 B (β) we have s 0 · β s 2 s 0 · pa, so there is not a witness to insecurity of the system at the sequence pa. The reader may confirm that this system is in fact ta 3 -secure. We remark here that we have ta 3 A (p) ta 3 A ( ) and ta 3 B (p) ta 3 B ( ), but ta 3 B (pa) ( , , a) ta 3 B (a). That is, in general, the value ta 3 B (αa) depends on more than the values ta 3 B (α) and ta 3 A (α) and the action a; additional information (namely, does α | dom(a) u hold) about the sequence α is required to determine ta 3 B (αa). We discuss the significance of this below. 2
Prohibitive interpretation
Example 2 shows that if we would like instead to prioritize prohibitions over permissions when interpreting a policy, we need a different representation of the maximal information permitted to an agent than that provided by the function ta 3 . It is not completely obvious what should be the deduced prohibitions that prevent the use of an edge α | dom(a) u as a justification for the transmission of information from dom(a) to u in the transition from state α to state αa.
However, we may apply some general constraints to suggest a definition. First of all, note that for static policies, the function ta has the property that the information available to domain u immediately after an action a performed by domain dom(a), should depend only on the action a and the information possessed by domains u and dom(a). The function ta 3 does not have this property: see the remark at the end of Example 2.
A general way to ensure that the state of information of domain u after action a depends only on the prior states of information of domains u and dom(a), is to condition the definition of the maximal information permitted to be known to u on the distributed knowledge of the group {u, dom(a)}. This suggests the following inductive definition of a function ta 2 , similar to ta, defined by ta 2 u ( ) and if α | D {dom(a),u} (dom(a) u), then
u is a validity of epistemic logic, so this definition strengthens the condition under which information is transmitted in the definition of ta 3 . Intuitively, this definition permits transmission of dom(a)'s information to u only when it is distributed knowledge to u and dom(a) that dom(a) u, i.e., there is not the possibility, so far as these domains jointly know, that the current state of the policy satisfies dom(a) u, prohibiting the transmission of information from dom(a) to u. Thus, the definition takes the point of view that transmission is permitted whenever the agents would jointly be able to confirm that there is not an explicit prohibition to the transmission.
As it stands, the definition of ta 2 is incomplete, because in order to interpret the condition α | D {dom(a),u} (dom(a) u), we need an appropriate Kripke structure in order to evaluate the distributed knowledge operator. We may take A * to be the set of worlds of this structure, and derive satisfaction of atomic propositions from the policy, but it remains to specify equivalence relations ∼ v for v ∈ D. Intuitively, an equivalence α ∼ v β holds when agent v is not able to distinguish between the traces α and β: whenever the system is in state α, agent v considers it possible that the system is in state β. What these equivalence relations should be is not immediately apparent. We take the approach of identifying some constraints on these equivalence relations and then working with the maximal relations satisfying these constraints. The constraints we use are inspired in part by technical conditions on equivalence relations used by Rushby [Rus92] as part of a proof technique for his definition of intransitive noninterference. We return to this application of such equivalence relations in Sect. 4.
First, consider the general constraint, that the way agent u's state of information is updated when action a is performed, should depend only on the prior state of information of u and dom(a). This can be captured at the level of the relations ∼ v by means of the following constraint:
(WSC) For all traces α, β, and actions a, if α ∼ u β and α ∼ dom(a) β then αa ∼ u βa.
(We call this constraint WSC since it is essentially the same as Rushby's condition of Weak Step Consistency [Rus92] .) Although it does not mention the policy explicitly, this constraint is not inconsistent with the state of the policy being a factor in how u's knowledge is updated. However, it requires that the way that the policy is taken into account depends only on information jointly available to domains u and dom(a).
Next, to factor in the prohibitions to information transfer implied by the policy, note that one case where the policy clearly prohibits transfer of information from a domain dom(a) to u when action a is performed after sequence α is where α | dom(a) u. Thus, domain u's state of information in state αa should be the same as its information in state α in this case. This suggests the following constraint:
(DLR) For all traces α, and actions a, if α | dom(a) u then αa ∼ u α.
The nomenclature DLR arises from the fact that this is essentially a dynamic generalization of Rushby's condition of Locally Respects [Rus92] . A slightly stronger alternative of DLR is the following:
(DLR ) For all traces α, and actions a, if there exists a trace β such that α ∼ u β and α ∼ dom(a) β and β | dom(a) u then αa ∼ u α.
In fact, in the context of WSC, this is equivalent to DLR. Suppose that we now accept WSC and DLR as reasonable constraints on the equivalence relations ∼ u corresponding to the maximal knowledge that an agent u is permitted to have. Indexed collections of equivalence relations may be partially ordered by pointwise containment. (That is, we take
Given the dynamic policy , let {∼ unw u } u∈D be the smallest collection of equivalence relations that is consistent with WSC and DLR. Intuitively, these smallest relations are the ones that allow for the maximal amount of information flow in the system that is consistent with the constraints. (The smaller the equivalence class, the larger the agent's amount of knowledge.) We call these relations the unwinding relations. The following fact will be useful below. We now take the relations {∼ unw u } u∈D as the equivalence relations in the Kripke structure needed to interpret the distributed knowledge operator in the definition of the functions ta 2 u . We call the derived security notion associated to these functions ta 2 -security. For u ∈ D we also write ∼ 2 u for the relation on traces defined by α ∼ 2 u β iff ta 2 u (α) ta 2 u (β). However, we note that we could also take the unwinding relations directly as the basis for another definition of security: Definition 3 A system is unwinding-secure with respect to a policy if, for all traces α, β and domain u, we have
In fact, it turns out that this does not give a new definition of security. The following result shows that the unwinding relations correspond precisely to the information flow modelled by the function ta 2 .
Proof We establish the containments ∼ unw
u , we argue by induction on the number of steps of a derivation of the statement α ∼ unw u β using rules WSC, DLR and the rules for an equivalence relation. The cases for reflexivity, transitivity and symmetry are direct from the fact that ∼ 2 u has these properties. For the DLR case, suppose that α | dom(a) u, so that we have αa ∼ unw u α. By validity of the formula D G (φ) ⇒ φ, we have also α | D {dom(a),u} (dom(a) u), so by the definition of ta 2 we have αa ∼ 2 u α, as required. For the WSC case, suppose that α ∼ unw u β and α ∼ unw dom(a) β, so that αa ∼ unw u βa by WSC. By the inductive hypothesis, we have α ∼ 2 u β and α ∼ 2 dom(a) β, i.e., ta 2 u (α) ta 2 u (β) and ta 2 dom(a) (α) ta 2 dom(a) (β). Moreover, it also follows that
u), so that the same case of the definition of ta 2 is selected in both ta 2 u (αa) and ta 2 u (βa). It follows that ta 2 u (αa) ta 2 u (βa), i.e., αa ∼ 2 dom(a) βa, as required. For ∼ 2 u ⊆ ∼ unw u , we argue by induction on the combined length of α and β that α ∼ 2 dom(a) β implies α ∼ unw dom(a) β. The base case of α β is trivial by reflexivity. By symmetry, it suffices to consider the case of α αa and β, where the result has already been established for sequences of shorter combined length. We suppose that α ∼ 2 dom(a) β, i.e., ta 2 u (αa) ta 2 u (β), and show that α ∼ unw dom(a) β. We consider two cases, corresponding to the cases of the definition of ta 2 .
In the first case, we have α | D {dom(a),u} (dom(a) u), so that ta 2 u (α) ta 2 u (αa), and hence ta 2 
, then we may switch the roles of αa and β b and argue as above, so it suffices to consider the case where β | D {dom(a),u} (dom(a) u). In this case, we have ta 2
It is immediate from Theorem 3.1 that unwinding security and ta 2 -security are equivalent. Thus, these definitions lend support to each other and help to explain each other: the functions ta 2 give an intuitive, concrete description of the information flows that are permitted when security is interpreted using the unwinding relations.
Moreover, Theorem 3.1 shows that ta 2 -security provides a feasible general framework for security definitions. To instantiate this framework, we must provide a collection of equivalence relations {∼ u } u∈D to be used to interpret the distributed knowledge operator in the definition. It is reasonable to ask that however we do so, it should be the case that the resulting relations {∼ 2 u } u∈D are exactly the relations {∼ u } u∈D , so that the definition of ta 2 is self-consistent. 2 Theorem 3.1 shows that this condition is in fact satisfiable.
There remains some circularity in this justification of the definitions of unwinding security and ta 2 -security. In particular, these definitions are both based on the assumption that the constraints WSC and DLR are the only constraints that should be applied to the flow of information in order to satisfy the policy, and that the resulting relations give an acceptable notion of permitted agent knowledge. However, if a case can be made that further constraints should be placed on the semantics, then a comparison similar to that made above can be considered.
The next lemma shows that ta 2 -security implies ta 3 -security.
β for all α, β ∈ A * and all u ∈ D. Moreover, ta 2 -security implies ta 3 -security.
Proof By induction on the combined length of α and β. The base case is trivial by reflexivity. Consider the case of αa and β, and suppose ta 3
In the case that β | dom(b) u, we may swap the roles of αa and β b and argue as in the previous paragraph.
, and it follows that a b and ta 3 u (α) ta 3 u (β ) and ta 3 dom(a) (α) ta 3 dom(a) (β ). By induction, we obtain that α ∼ unw u β and α ∼ unw dom(a) β . It now follows by WSC that αa ∼ unw u β a β, as required.
2 It is worth noting that the circularity here is similar to the circularity in the semantics of knowledge-based programs [FHMV95] .
The following example shows that ta 2 -security differs from ta 3 -security.
Example 3 As already seen in Example 2, the system in Fig. 1 is ta 3 -secure. But, we have that p ∼ unw B and p ∼ unw A by WSC. By applying DLR, we obtain pa ∼ unw B a. Using Theorem 3.1, we have ta 2 B (pa) ta 2 B (a), and since obs B (s 0 · pa) obs B (s 0 · a), the system is not ta 2 -secure. 2
A sufficient condition for equivalence
The outcome of the discussion so far is that we have identified two definitions of security of dynamic policies, one of which (ta 3 -security) takes a permissive interpretation of policies, and the other (ta 2 -security, or equivalently, unwinding security) takes a prohibitive interpretation. As noted above, these two interpretations may be in conflict for some policies. It is therefore of interest to understand when a policy is free of this conflict. The following notion is useful in this regard.
Definition 4 A policy is local with respect to a collection of equivalence relations
An equivalent statement is that
for all traces α and domains u, v , when the equivalence relation used to interpret knowledge is ≈-equivalence.
That is, a pair of agents always have distributed knowledge of whether one may interfere with the other. 
Proof Suppose that the policy is local with respect to {∼ 3 u } u∈D . Then these relations satisfy WSC. For, suppose that ta 3 u (α) ta 3 u (β) and ta 3 dom(a) (α) ta 3 dom(a) (β). Note that, by locality, we have that
v . It follows that the same case is chosen in the definitions of ta 3 u (αa) and ta 3 u (βa), and we obtain that ta 3 u (αa) ta 3 u (βa). It is immediate from the definition of ta 3 that the relations {∼ 3 u } u∈D satisfy DLR. By the previous paragraph, these relations also satisfy WSC. Since {∼ unw u } u∈D are the minimal relations satisfying WSC and DLR, we obtain
The converse also holds by Lemma 2. From this, we obtain the claimed independence of locality on the choice of equivalence relation.
Lemma 4 A given policy is local with respect to the associated relations {∼
Proof First suppose that is local with respect to {∼ 3 u } u∈D . Then by Lemma 3 and Theorem 3.1, we have
Consequently, in the sequel we say simply that the policy is local, if it is local with respect to either of these relations.
The following result shows that for local policies, the conflict between a permissive and a prohibitive reading of policies does not arise.
Theorem 3.2 If
is a local policy then ta 3 -security and ta 2 -security with respect to are equivalent.
Proof This is immediate from the fact that if the policy is local, then for all traces α,
. This claim follows straightforwardly from the properties of distributed knowledge.
Indeed, locality exactly captures the condition under which the permissive and the prohibitive interpretations of a policy are equivalent. We need one technical condition on this statement. Say that a domain u is inactive when dom −1 (u) ∅, i.e., the domain has no actions that it can perform, so it plays only the role of an observer in the system. Note that policy edges of the form α | u v where u is inactive have no bearing on the definitions of ta 3 -security or unwinding-security (and hence also not on the equivalent ta 2 -security) since all references to the policy in these definitions occur only in the form α | u v with u dom(a) for some action a. Intuitively, the interference relation u v is concerned with the ability of domain u to perform actions that transfer information to domain v , and for a domain with no actions, such transfer of information is always impossible. We say that policy has no edges from inactive domains, when for all domains u that are inactive, we have α | u v for all traces α and domains v . By the above observation, every policy is semantically equivalent to one that has no edges from inactive domains, so we may assume this condition without loss of generality. Subject to this assumption, we have the following: Theorem 3.3 Let S D, dom, A be a signature, and let be a policy for this signature that has no edges from inactive domains. Suppose that for all systems M for the signature S, M is ta 3 -secure with respect to iff M is ta 2 -secure with respect to . Then is local.
Proof We prove the converse, that is, we show that if is not local, then ta 3 -security and ta 2 -security with respect to differ on some system M . Suppose that is not local. By Lemma 4, we may use the relations {∼ 3 u } u∈D , so we have that there exist traces α, β ∈ A * and domains u, v such that α ∼ 3 u β and α ∼ 3 v β, and α | u v and β | u v . By Lemma 2, we also have α ∼ unw u β and α ∼ unw v β. Since has no edges from inactive domains, and α | u v , domain u has actions. Let a be any action with dom(a) u. Then, by condition WSC, it follows
To complete the proof, we note that M is ta 3 -secure with respect to , so that the two notions disagree on system M . To see this, note that any insecurity must involve domain v , since obs w (γ ) 0 for all γ and w v .
, as required for ta 3 -security. Given this result, one reasonable approach to the possibility of conflicting interpretations of policies is to require that the policy be local, so that we are left with a single notion of security that supports both the permissive and prohibitive interpretation of policies. A potential disadvantage of this is that such a restriction results in a loss of expressiveness: certain policies can no longer be expressed. The following result shows that, in fact, provided that one is interested in ta 2 -security, there is no loss of expressiveness: for every policy, there is a local policy that is equivalent with respect to ta 2 -security.
Lemma 5 For every policy over signature D, dom, A , there is a local policy ≤ such that for all systems M with signature D, dom, A , system M is ta 2 -secure with respect to iff M is ta 2 -secure with respect to .
Proof We write [α] ∼ for the equivalence class of α with respect to an equivalence relation ∼. In the following, the unwinding {∼ unw u } u∈D refers to the policy . Define the policy by
It is clear that ≤ . Let {≈ unw u } u∈D be the smallest unwinding satisfying WSC and DLR with respect to the policy . We claim that ∼ unw
We will show that for every u ∈ D and every α, β ∈ A * , we have α ≈ unw This shows that the system M is ta 2 -secure with respect to if and only if it is ta 2 -secure with respect to . It remains to show that the policy is ta 3 -local. First, we will show for every u ∈ D and every α, β ∈ A * , that ta 3 u (α) ta 3 u (β) (with respect to ) implies α ≈ unw u β. We prove this by an induction on the combined length of α and β. The base case of α β is trivial by reflexivity of ≈ unw u . Assume the claim for all traces of combined length shorter than | α | + | β |. Let α α a and suppose that ta 3 u (α) ta 3 u (β). We need to show that α a ≈ unw u β.
• Case 1: α | dom(a) u. In this case, we have ta 3 u (α a) ta 3 u (α ), so ta 3 u (α ) ta 3 u (β). By induction hypothesis, we have α ≈ unw u β. By DLR, we have α a ≈ unw u α , so by transitivity we obtain α a ≈ unw
u, since otherwise we may argue as in Case 1 for β b and apply symmetry. It follows that ta 3
, and we conclude that a b and ta 3 u (α ) ta 3 u (β ) and ta 3 dom(a) (α ) ta 3 dom(a) (β ). By induction hypothesis we have α ≈ unw u β and α ≈ unw dom(a) β and by WSC, we obtain that α a ≈ unw u β a.
The ta 3 -locality follows: if ta 3
We say that two policies and for a common signature D, dom,
Intuitively, this says that the two policies are identical, except that they may differ on edges α | u v from inactive domains u. Since such a domain u cannot take any action to cause information flow to v , this difference cannot, in practice, be detected. The following result makes this intuition precise. Say that two policies and are two policies for a common signature are equivalent with respect to a notion of security if for all systems M for the signature, M is secure with respect to iff M is secure with respect to .
Theorem 3.4 Suppose that and are two policies for a common signature D, dom, A . Then and are equivalent with respect to ta 3 -security iff and are identical up to inactive domains.
Proof In this proof, ta 3, and ta 3, denote the ta 3 function that refers to and , respectively. Suppose first that and are identical up to inactive domains. Then a straightforward induction on the length of α ∈ A * shows that for all u ∈ D, we have ta 3, u (α) ta 3, u (α). (Note that in the inductive case for ta 3 u (αa), we have that a ∈ dom −1 (dom(a)) ∅, so dom(a) u iff dom(a) u.) It follows that and are equivalent with respect to ta 3 -security.
Conversely, suppose that and are not identical up to inactive domains. We show that they are not equivalent with respect to ta 3 -security. We have that there exists α ∈ A * and domains u, v with dom −1 (u) nonempty, such that (without loss of generality)
Then, by construction, M is ta 3 -secure with respect to . But we have obs v (αa) 0 and obs v (α) 1, so M is not ta 3 -secure with respect to . Thus, these policies disagree on M .
In particular, it follows that if is a nonlocal policy that has no edges from inactive domains (so that the reason for nonlocality is not trivial, in the sense that it must involve edges from a domain with a nonempty set of actions), then there is no local policy that is equivalent with respect to ta 3 -security. Thus, ta 3 -security is inherently a more expressive notion than ta 2 -security.
Special cases
To judge the adequacy of a definition of security with respect to dynamic policies, it is useful to verify that the definition gives the expected answer in a number of simple scenarios where we have clear intuitions about the desired behaviour of the definition. The following provide some examples.
Static policies
We say that a dynamic policy
That is, the policy never changes from its initial state. A static policy may equivalently be presented as the relation π 1,3 ( ) ⊆ D × D, the projection of the dynamic policy to the first and third components, which is in precisely the format for classical intransitive noninterference policies [GM82] .
Static policies are a special case of dynamic policies, that have been subject to a significant amount of study [HY87, RG99, Rus92, vdM15], so it is reasonable to expect that any definition for dynamic policies should reduce to an accepted definition when applied to the static case. The following result shows that this is the case.
Theorem 3.5 If is a static policy, then the following are equivalent:
Proof This is immediate from the definitions, together with the fact that for static policies ,
This result shows that ta 3 -security and ta 2 -security agree and collapse to the standard notion of ta-security when restricted to static policies. This provides support for these definitions.
Globally known policies
Another setting that can serve as a useful test case for the adequacy of definitions of security for dynamic policies is a group of agents subject to an information flow policy that is set by a policy authority P , and in which all agents are permitted to know the policy state at all times.
Dynamic intransitive noninterference revisited 1101 Formally, these are dynamic policies in which the set of domains contains P , and we have the following:
(GK1) For all traces α and domains u, we have that α | P u. That is, domain P , which controls the policy state, is always permitted to transmit information to u. This ensures that u is always able to know the policy state.
(GK2) For all traces α, β and domains u, v , we have that α | P β | P implies that α | u v iff β | u v . That is, the policy setting depends only on the past actions of domain P .
We say that a dynamic policy satisfying these conditions is globally known.
Theorem 3.6 If the policy is globally known, then it is local.
Proof Suppose that the policy is globally known. We need to show that for all u, v ∈ D and α, β ∈ A * , we have α ∼ unw
We claim that, in fact, α ∼ unw u β implies α | P β | P , from which the desired result follows using GK2.
The proof of the claim is by induction on the length of the derivation of α ∼ unw u β. The base case of a step in which α ∼ unw u β is reflexivity by reflexivity is trivial, and the cases of steps using symmetry or transitivity are also straightforward.
Consider a step using DLR. Then α βa and we have α | dom(a) u. By GK1, we have dom(a) P . Thus α | P αa | P β | P , as required.
Finally, consider a step using WSC. Then α α a and β β a for some action a, and we have α ∼ unw u β and α ∼ unw dom(a) β . From α ∼ unw u β , we obtain by induction that α | P β | P . It follows that α | P α a | P β a | P β | P , as required.
Since by Theorem 3.2, for local policies the definitions of ta 3 -security and ta 2 -security are equivalent, these definitions are equivalent for all globally known policies, so these definitions lend mutual support to each other in this case.
Locally known policies
A slightly more general case in which the notions of ta 3 -security and ta 2 -security coincide are policies in which agents are always aware of their incoming and/or outgoing policy edges. Formally, define the policy to be locally known to the sender (with respect to equivalence relations {∼ unw
Similarly, say that the policy is locally known to the receiver if we have, for all u, v ∈ D, that α ∼ unw
It is easily seen that if the policy is locally known to the sender and/or the receiver (with respect to either ∼ 2 or ∼ 3 ), then it is local. Thus, this again is a case where the notions of ta 3 -security and ta 2 -security are equivalent.
Policy refinement
Recall that ≤ says that policy is more restrictive than policy . We therefore expect that if a system is secure with respect to , it is also secure with respect to . The following result shows that ta 2 -security behaves as expected with respect to this order.
Proposition 2 If
≤ and system M is ta 2 -secure with respect to , then M is ta 2 -secure with respect to . The following example illustrates a further subtlety concerning ta 3 -security: unlike ta 2 -security, it is not monotonic with respect to the restrictiveness order on policies. Figure 2 shows a system and a policy for two agents A, B . Only the observations of agent B are depicted; for agent A we assume that obs A (s) 0 for all states s, so that there can be no insecurity with respect to agent A. For agent B , the only possible cases of ta 3 -insecurity are when obs B (s 0 · α) 1 and obs B (s 0 · β) 0. This implies that we have α abaα and that aba is not a prefix of β. However, in this case, ta 3 B (β) cannot contain a subterm a, since there are no strict prefixes γ of β with γ | A B . On the other hand, ta 3 B (abaα ) always contains a subterm a, since ta 3 B (aba) (( , , b), ( , , a) , a). Thus, we cannot have ta 3 B (abaα) ta 3 B (β). It follows that the system is ta 3 -secure with respect to . We note that the policy is not local, because
Example 6
On the other hand, consider the policy , which is defined identically to , except that on state s 6 we take s 6 | A B . Plainly, ≤ . However, the system is not ta 3 -secure with respect to . Note that with respect to policy , we have ta 3 B (aba) (( , , b), ( , , a) , a) ta 3 B (baa), whereas obs B (s 0 · aba) 1 and obs B (s 0 · baa) 0.
However, for local policies, ta 3 -security behaves as expected. This follows from Proposition 2, the equivalence of ta 3 -security and ta 2 -security for local policies. The following result shows that, in fact it holds slightly more generally, and we can also use monotonicity to derive ta 3 -security for non-local policies.
Proposition 3 Suppose that
≤ and that is local. If a system M is ta 3 -secure with respect to , then M is ta 3 -secure with respect to .
Proof Let M be a ta 3 -secure system with respect to . Since is local, we obtain from Theorem 3.2 that M is ta 2 -secure with respect to . By Proposition 2, the system is ta 2 -secure with respect to . Since ta 2 -security implies ta 3 -security (by Lemma 2 and Theorem 3.1), we have that M is ta 3 -secure with respect to .
Related work using automaton semantics
To make the case for our definitions above, we now compare them to related prior work that is also stated in an automaton based semantics. (We defer discussion of related programming language-based work to Sect. 7.) To the best of our knowledge, the only other semantics for dynamic intransitive noninterference policies in automatonbased systems are those of Leslie [Les06] and Eggert et. al. [ESW13] . Both works deal with policy enhanced systems. Recall that in this model, we write s | u v iff information flow from u to v is allowed in the state s. Leslie's definition of intransitive noninterference is a direct adaption of Rushby's ipurge function [Rus92] to the dynamic setting. Rushby's ipurge function in turn was an adaptation of Goguen and Meseguer's [GM82] purge function for transitive policies to the intransitive case. The intuition of Goguen and Meseguer was that actions of domains u that are not permitted to interfere with a domain v should have no observable effect on v . Thus, if we delete (or "purge") an action of u from a trace, there should be no change in v 's observations. Rushby's definition for the intransitive case is based on the observation that if u v and v w , but not u w , then while an action of u may not directly influence w , it may influence v , and a later action of v may then influence w . Thus, rather than purging actions of noninterfering domains, Rushby deletes actions from a trace for which there does not exist a "causal" subsequence of actions that forms a chain of permitted influences, ultimately affecting the domain of interest. This is formally captured by means of a sources function, that, given a sequence of actions α and a domain u, intuitively returns the set of domains from which α contains such a causal sequence ending in u. Similar to Rushby's ipurge function, Leslie's purge function is based on a sources function, that attempts to adapt Rushby's definition to take into account that the policy may be changing during the trace. Formally, the dynamic version of this function is defined for every u ∈ D and s ∈ S by dsrc ( , u, s) {u} and for α ∈ A * and a ∈ A by dsrc(aα, u, s)
v , and else dsrc(aα, u, s) dsrc(α, u, s · a). Intuitively, the set dsrc(aα, u, s) is the set of all agents, to which the information that the action a has been performed, is transmitted by the sequence of actions α.
Leslie's purge function for intransitive noninterference is inductively defined for every u ∈ D, s ∈ S , a ∈ A, and α ∈ A * by Lpurge ( , u, s) and
if there is some v ∈ dsrc(aα, u, s) with s | dom(a) v , and else Lpurge(aα, u, s) Lpurge(α, u, s · a). This function removes exactly those actions from a trace that are from agents where interference to u is forbidden by the policy. The corresponding security definition is: Definition 5 A system M is Lpurge-secure with respect to a policy if for all domains u and sequences of actions α holds: obs u (s 0 · Lpurge(α, u, s 0 )) obs u (s 0 · α).
Our notion of ta 3 -security is incomparable to Lpurge-security, in the sense that neither of them implies the other. One the one hand, on systems with a static policy, Lpurge-security is equivalent to Rushby's IP-security and hence, as shown in [vdM15] , strictly weaker than TA-security, which is the equivalent to ta 3 -security on such systems. On the other hand, the following example presents a ta 3 -secure, but not Lpurge-secure system.
Example 7
We consider again the system in Fig. 1 . As shown in Example 2, this system is ta 3 -secure. However the system is not Lpurge-secure, since we have obs B (s 0 · Lpurge(pa, B , s 0 )) obs B (s 0 · Lpurge(a, B , s 1 )) obs B (s 0 · a) 0 1 obs B (s 0 · pa).
Similar to ta 3 -security, Lpurge-security is not monotonic with respect to the restrictiveness order on policies.
Example 8
The system in Fig. 3 has two different configurations of the dynamic policy indicated by the dotted policy edge in state s 1 : in one configuration there is an edge from D to L and in the other, this edge is absent. First, consider the configuration where this edge exists. With respect to Lpurge-security, this system is insecure, since we have Lpurge(hd , L, s 0 ) Lpurge(d , L, s 1 ) d , but obs L (s 0 · hd ) 0 1 obs L (s 0 · d ).
However, if we remove the edge from D to L in state s 1 , this system becomes Lpurge-secure: all traces starting with h will be purged to and all traces starting with d have a purge value different from . 2
Our notion of ta 2 is strictly stronger than Lpurge-security. That these two are indeed different follows from the same argument as above for systems with static policies.
Lemma 6 Every ta 2 -secure system is Lpurge-secure.
Proof We show this lemma by contraposition. Suppose that the system is not Lpurge-secure. Then there are u ∈ D and α ∈ A * with obs u (s 0 · α) obs u (s 0 · Lpurge(α, u, s 0 )) .
We will show the following claim: For every β, β ∈ A * with α ββ and for every γ ∈ A * with Lpurge(α, u, s 0 ) γ Lpurge(β , u, s 0 · β) and for every v ∈ dsrc(β , u, s 0 · β), we have β ∼ unw v γ . In [ESW13] , some problems with Lpurge-security are identified and a new purge-based security definition is proposed in response. This notion uses the same dynamic sources function as Leslie's does, but the purge function does not change in the state parameter if an action has been removed. More precisely, their dynamic intransitive purge function is defined for every u ∈ D and s ∈ S by ipurge ( , u, s) and for every a ∈ A and α ∈ A * if dom(a) ∈ dsrc(aα, u, s), then ipurge(aα, u, s) a ipurge(α, u, s · a) and else ipurge(aα, u, s) ipurge(α, u, s). The notion of i-security is defined as usual as the property that for all agent u, all states s, and all action sequences α and β with ipurge(α, u, s) ipurge(β, u, s), we have obs u (s · α) obs u (s · β).
This notion of security is incomparable with our security definitions of ta 3 -security and ta 2 -security. On the one hand, we have, due to the static case, that i-security does not imply ta 3 -security. The following example gives a system, with a local policy, that is ta 2 -secure and ta 3 -secure, but not i-secure.
Example 9
The system in Fig. 4 is clearly not i-secure. We consider the traces hd and d since the ipurge values of these two traces are the same for L if one starts purging in s 0 : ipurge(hd , L, s 0 ) ipurge(d , L, s 0 ) d . But the observations after these two traces are different for L.
However, for any trace that starts with an h action, the ta 3 value is , and for any trace that starts with a d action, the ta 3 value differs from . Hence, for any two traces that lead to different observations for L have different ta 3 values. Note, that the dynamic policy of this system is local, and hence, this system is also ta 2 -secure.
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Fig. 5. Relations between dynamic intransitive noninterference definitions
We would argue that this system is intuitively secure, so this gives grounds to prefer our two definitions over i-security. First, note that in every state D is permitted to learn about H actions, so, in particular, it should be permitted for D to know in state s 0 that H has not yet acted. In state s 2 , L can deduce that D acted before H did, but D was permitted to transfer its information to L when it acted, so this is not an insecurity. Finally, L cannot distinguish state s 1 from s 0 , so this state is secure on the grounds that the initial state of a system always is (noninterference definitions, intuitively, aim to prohibit agents from learning information about what has happened in a system).
2
Although i-security implies Lpurge-security, Example 9 shows that these security definitions still differ on systems with local policies. The implications of the security definitions analyzed in this work are depicted in Fig. 5 . All these implications are strict in general, and the definitions of ta 2 -security and ta 3 -security only collapse on systems with local policies.
We can summarize our reasons for preferring the definitions of the present paper to these prior works as follows. First, both Lpurge-security and i-security are equivalent to Rushby's IP-security in the case of static policies. This means that these definitions are are subject to the problems identified by van der Meyden [vdM15] . One of these problems is an example presented in [vdM15] , which shows that Rushby's IP-security fails to detect a covert channel based on ordering of actions. A second weakness is that IP-security has a weaker relationship to the unwinding proof method for intransitive non-interference proposed by Rushby [Rus92] than does ta-security. As shown in [vdM15] , this proof method is sound but not complete for IP-security, but both sound and complete for TA-security. Since the proof method is itself is based on well-founded intuitions, this lends further support to TA-security. (We establish a related completeness result for ta 2 -security and ta 3 -security with respect to local dynamic policies in the following section, that shows that a similar justification exists for these extensions of TA-security to the dynamic case.) Secondly, when we consider Lpurge-security and i-security with respect to dynamic policies, there are examples for each where they give intuitively incorrect results. We refer to [ESW13] for examples showing Lpurge-security yields undesirable conclusions. Example 9 shows that i-security can also yield undesirable results.
Perfect recall attackers
All our definitions of security are stated in terms of what information may be contained in an agent's observation at the state reached after a trace. In general, when considering the deductive capabilities of agents in computer security, it is appropriate to assume that an adversary will reason based not just on their current observation, but also using their past observations. This suggests that we should consider a perfect recall attacker. In the case of TA-security, a definition stated using a perfect recall attacker is known to be equivalent to one stated using just the final observation of traces [vdM15] . We formulate this result in a more general way, so that it also applies to the other definitions we state in this paper.
First, to capture a perfect recall attacker, we define the view of an agent u inductively, by view u ( ) obs u (s 0 ) and
where every α ∈ A * and a ∈ A. Here, σ • x denotes the absorptive concatenation of an element x of a set X to a string whose final element is in X , defined by x x , and σ y • x σ yx if x y and σ y • x σ y if y x . The reason we apply this type of concatenation is to capture the asynchronous behaviour of the system, where agents do not necessarily have access to a global clock. Intuitively, agent u is aware of its own actions, so these are always available in its perfect recall view. This is captured by the first clause of the definition of view u . However, when another agent performs an action, this may or may not cause a change in u's observation. If it does, then u detects the change, and the new observation is added to its view. However, if there is no change of observation, then there is no change to the view, since the agent is assumed to operate asynchronously, so that it does not know for what length of time it makes each observation.
We generalize the structure of the functions such as ta as follows. Consider an indexed collection of functions f {f u } u∈D , each with domain A * , and defined by f u ( ) and
for some boolean condition C and function g, where α ∈ A * , a ∈ A and u ∈ D. Note that the collections ta, ta 3 , as well as ta 2 are in this pattern. In all of this three cases, we have g(α, a, u) (f dom(a) (α), a), but the conditions C are different. For ta, we have C (α, a, u) dom(a) u, for ta 3 , we have C (α, a, u) α | dom(a) u, and for ta 2 , we have C (α, a, u) α | D {dom(a),u} (dom(a) u). The intuition for the conditions on f are similar: f u (α) represents the maximal information permitted to domain u after sequence α. The expression C (α, a, u) captures the conditions under which information is permitted to flow to domain u when action a is performed after sequence α, and g(α, a, u) captures the information that is permitted to flow in this case. If C (α, a, u) does not hold, then there is no change to the maximal permitted information, otherwise we add g(α, a, u) to the maximal permitted information. Say that a system is f -secure if for all α, β ∈ A * with f u (α) f u (β), we have obs u (s 0 · α) obs u (s 0 · β). An alternative definition with the view function instead of obs is:
The notion of f -security says, intuitively, that an attacker reasoning on the basis of just the observation at u has no more information than is encoded by f u , whereas f -view-security says that a perfect recall attacker at u has no more information than is encoded by f u .
To prove the equivalence of f -security and f -view-security, we need a technical condition. We say that f is self-aware if dom(a) u implies C (α, a, u), and g(α, a, u) g(β, b, u) implies a b. Intuitively, in the self-aware case, f u (α) encodes at least a record of all the actions of domain u that occur in α. The following result says that under this condition, the observation-based attacker and the perfect recall attacker are equivalent.
Proof Assume first that M is not f -view-secure. Then there are u ∈ D and α, β ∈ A * of minimal combined length with f u (α) f u (β) and view u (α) view u (β). At least one of α and β is not the empty trace, suppose that it is α and let α α a for some α ∈ A * and a ∈ A. Then there are two cases:
• Case 1: f u (α a) f u (α ). Then f u (α ) f u (β), so from the minimality of α and β it follows that view u (α ) view u (β) and hence view u (α ) view u (α a). Since C (α, a, u) is false, we have by self-awareness that dom(a) u, so view u (α a) view u (α )obs u (s 0 · α a). Therefore, we have obs u (s 0 · α a) obs u (s 0 · β). • Case 2: f u (α a) f u (α ). We can assume that β β b for some β ∈ A * and b ∈ A with f u (β b) f u (β ) since otherwise, we proceed with the first case with the roles of α and β swapped. From the inductive definition of f u and self-awareness, it follows that a b and f u (α ) f u (β ). By the minimality of α and β, we have view u (α ) view u (β ). There are two cases of the definitions of view u (α a) and view u (β a), depending on whether dom(a) u, but in either case, it follows that obs u (s 0 · α a) obs u (s 0 · β b), since the only difference in these sequences can be in the final observation.
The other direction of the proof follows directly from the definition of the view function.
Since we assume that policies are always reflexive, in the case dom(a) u we have β | dom(a) u for all traces β. Moreover, it follows that dom(a) u implies α | D {dom(a),u} (dom(a) u). Thus, the definitions of ta 3 and ta 2 are easily seen to be self-aware, and it follows from Lemma 7 that ta 3 -security is equivalent to ta 3 -view-security and that ta 2 -security is equivalent to ta 2 -view-security.
Proof techniques
In the theory of static (intransitive) noninterference policies, unwinding relations provide a proof technique that can be used to show that a system is secure. An unwinding relation is a relation on the states of the system that satisfies certain conditions. We show in this section that a similar technique applies to dynamic policies. In fact, the conditions that we need are very similar to those defined on the policy above, with the main difference being that they are stated with respect to states of the system rather than traces.
Proof technique for ta 2 -security
Let M be a system and let ≈ u be an equivalence relation on the states of M for each u ∈ D.
(OC M ) If s ≈ u t then obs u (s) obs u (t).
We call a collection {≈ u } u∈D of equivalence relations satisfying DLR M , WSC M and OC M a 2-unwinding on M with respect to . We remark that for policy-enhanced systems, we have the following version of DLR M :
which formulates the conditions to uniformly quantify over states of the system rather than both over states and traces. It is straightforward to show that if a policy-enhanced system M satisfies DLR-PE M then it satisfies DLR M .
The following result states that to prove ta 2 -security, it suffices to show that there exists a 2-unwinding on the system. Proof To show that M is ta 2 -secure, we argue that the relations {∼ unw u } u∈D , which by definition satisfy WSC and DLR, also satisfy OC. For this, we claim that for all α, β ∈ A * , if α ∼ unw u β then s 0 · α ≈ u s 0 · β. It is then immediate from OC M that OC holds for ∼ unw u . The proof of the claim is by induction on the derivation of α ∼ unw u β. The cases of α ∼ unw u β obtained by reflexivity, symmetry or transitivity are straightforward, using the fact that ≈ u has these properties. For DLR, if α ∼ unw u β is obtained by an application of DLR then α βa for some a ∈ A with α | dom(a) u. By DLR M , we have s 0 · α ≈ u s 0 · β, as required. For WSC, suppose that α ∼ unw u β is obtained by an application of WSC, so that we have α α a and β β a. where α ∼ unw u β and α ∼ unw dom(a) β. By induction, we have s 0 · α ≈ u s 0 · β and s 0 · α ≈ dom(a) s 0 · β . We now obtain s 0 · α a ≈ u s 0 · β a by WSC M , i.e., s 0 · α ≈ u s 0 · β, as required.
An unwinding on the system can often be naturally defined. We give an example below in the case of access control systems.
We may also show that unwindings provide a complete proof method, modulo the fact that we may need to work in a bisimilar system, rather than the system as presented. (See [vdM15] for an example that demonstrates that, already for static policies, we do not obtain completeness if we require that the unwinding be defined over the states of the system M itself. A more complex type of unwinding on the system M itself is shown to be complete for TA-security of static policies in [EvdMSW13] . It would be interesting to develop a generalization of this to the dynamic case, but we leave this for future work.) noninterference policies, and that a simple static check of the access control table suffices to verify the policy will be enforced. It was later shown by van der Meyden [vdM15] that, in fact, access control is also a complete enforcement mechanism for such policies, in the sense that every system that satisfies the policy is bisimilar to one using access control, with a setting that satisfies the static check. In this section, we develop a generalization of these results to dynamic noninterference policies.
A system with structured state, is a system equipped with Intuitively, contents(o, s) is the value of object o in state s, observe(u, s) is the set of objects that domain u is permitted to observe (or read) in state s, and alter(u, s) is the set of objects that domain u is permitted to alter (or write) in state s. The pair of functions observe, alter can be thought of as an encoding of an access control table that varies with the state of the system. We make an assumption on the set O of objects, namely, that this contains a special object oset(u) for each domain u ∈ D. We write the set of all these special objects as Osets(D) {oset(u) | u ∈ D} and assume Osets(D) ⊆ O. We assume that contents(oset(u), s) observe(u, s), so that the content of oset(u) is the set of all objects that are observable to u. Furthermore, we assume that oset(u) ∈ observe(u, s) for all domains u ∈ D and states s ∈ S , i.e., the object oset(u) is always observable by u. This is intuitively reasonable, given the meaning of this object, since domain u can always determine the value of oset(u) by checking directly which objects it is able to observe.
The motivation for these special objects oset(u) is that they are a kind of "meta-object" that can be used to specify if an agent is allowed to change the observable objects of another agent. More precisely, we may let oset(u) ∈ alter(v , s) if and only if in state s, domain v is allowed to influence which objects are observable by u.
We now state a number of conditions (resembling Rushby's "reference monitor conditions" [Rus92] ) that are intended to capture the intuitive semantics of the access control functions observe, alter, as they might be enforced by a reference monitor that restricts agents' ability to read and write objects as these access control 
Intuitively, condition DRM-1 says that a domain's observation depends only on the contents of the objects observable to the domain. Condition DRM-2 says that when a domain is permitted to alter an object, the new value of the object depends only on its previous value and the values of the objects observable by the acting domain. (The version of this constraint given here follows [vdM15] rather than [Rus92] .) Condition DRM-3 can be understood as stating that an action can change the value of an object only when the domain of the action is permitted by the access control setting to alter the object. Condition DRM-4 states that any object that is made newly observable to a domain u by an action a must be observable to the domain dom(a).
Condition DRM-5 is a kind of locality constraint, which states that when v is permitted to interfere with u, in situation s, the set observe(u, s) ∩ alter(v , s) of objects that u can observe and v can alter depends only on information local to domains u and v , as captured by the relations ≈ u and ≈ v . We note that this constraint actually only states a weak property of alter(v , s), as we already have that observe(u, s) depends only on the local state of u as captured by ≈ u .
The following stronger version of this condition is also of interest:
Here we have dropped the requirement that v be permitted to interfere with u in order for the dependency to hold. This stronger condition more closely resembles locality. We remark that have not introduced special objects aset(u) for each domain u, with the property that contents(aset(u), s) alter(u, s), as might be suggested by analogy with the objects oset(u). The results to follow do not require the introduction of these objects. However, in systems with such objects, and also satisfying the property aset(u) ∈ observe(u, s) condition DRM-5 would be necessarily satisfied.
Finally, condition DRM-6 relates the access control setting to the policy. Note that if there exists an object that domain u is able to write and domain v is able to read, then this object provides an obvious channel for information to flow from u to v . The condition states that in this situation, the resulting channel for information flow is permitted by the information flow policy .
Theorem 5.1 Suppose M is a system with structured state that satisfies properties DRM-1 to DRM-6 with respect to policy . Then M is ta 3 -secure with respect to . If M also satisfies the stronger condition DRM-5 , then M is ta 2 -secure with respect to .
Proof Assume that M is a system with structured state that satisfies properties DRM-1 to DRM-6 with respect to policy . We first show that M satisfies DLR M and WSC 3 M and OC M with respect to the relations {≈ u } u∈D . For property DLR M , suppose that α | dom(a) u. Then by DRM-6, we have alter(dom(a), s 0 · α) ∩ observe(u, s 0 · α) ∅. Thus, for all o ∈ observe(u, s 0 · α), we have o ∈ alter(dom(a), s 0 · α), and by DRM-3 we obtain that contents(o, s 0 · α) contents(o, s 0 · αa). This shows that s 0 · αa ≈ u s 0 · α, as required.
For WSC 3 M , suppose that α | dom(a) u and β | dom(a) u and s 0 · α ≈ u s 0 · β and s 0 · α ≈ dom(a) s 0 · β. We need to show that s 0 · αa ≈ u s 0 · βa, i.e., that for all o ∈ observe(u, s 0 · αa), we have contents(o, s 0 · αa) contents(o, s 0 · βa). Let o ∈ observe(u, s 0 · αa). By DRM-4 we have that o ∈ observe(u, s 0 · α) ∪ observe(dom(a), s 0 · α). From s 0 · α ≈ u s 0 · β and s 0 · α ≈ dom(a) s 0 · β we obtain that observe(u, s 0 · α) observe(u, s 0 · β) and observe(dom(a), s 0 · α) observe(dom(a), s 0 · β), and for all o ∈ observe(u, s 0 · α) ∪ observe(dom(a), s 0 · α) we have contents(o, s 0 · α) contents(o, s 0 · β). By two applications of DRM-5 (one for the pair of domains u, dom(a), and the other for the pair dom(a) ,dom(a)), we obtain that o ∈ alter(dom(a), s 0 · α) iff o ∈ alter(dom(a), s 0 · β). It therefore suffices to consider two cases: The property OC M is trivial, since this is just DRM-1. We now have that M satisfies DLR M and WSC 3 M and OC M . By Theorem 4.3, it follows that M is ta 3 -secure with respect to .
Suppose that M also satisfies the stronger condition DRM-5 . We show that M is ta 2 -secure with respect to .
It is easily checked that M satisfies DRM-1 to DRM-6 with respect to policy M , so by the above, we conclude that M is ta 3 -secure with respect to M . We claim that the policy M is local. This being the case, we obtain using Theorem 3.2 that M is ta 2 -secure with respect to M . By DRM-6, we have that M ≤ , so by Proposition 2 we get that M is ta 2 -secure with respect to .
To show that M is local, define the equivalence relations {∼ u } u∈D on A * by α ∼ u β iff s 0 ·α ≈ u s 0 ·β. It follows from the fact that M satisfies DLR M with respect to {≈ u } u∈D that M satisfies DLR with respect to {∼ u } u∈D . An argument similar to that above for WSC 3 M , but using DRM-5 in place of DRM-5, shows that M also satisfies WSC with respect to {∼ u } u∈D . Thus, for the smallest equivalence relations {∼ unw u } u∈D satisfying WSC and DLR with respect to M , we have ∼ unw u ⊆ ∼ u for all u ∈ D. Suppose that ta 3 u (α) ta 3 u (β) and ta 3 v (α) ta 3 v (β) (with respect to policy M ). We need to show that α | u M v iff β | u M v . By Lemma 2, we have that α ∼ unw u β and α ∼ unw v β. By what was shown above, we obtain that α ∼ u β and α ∼ v β, so s 0 · α ≈ u s 0 · β and s 0 · α ≈ v s 0 · β.
By DRM-5 we now obtain that observe(u,
Theorem 5.1 shows that access control mechanisms provide an implementation method that guarantees that a system constructed using this method is secure. It states a soundness result: any system that satisfies the reference monitor conditions with respect to a policy is secure for that policy.
It is also possible to prove a converse to this result, stating that any system that is secure with respect to a policy could have been constructed using access control mechanisms so as to satisfy the policy. To obtain such a result, we need to allow consideration of a bisimilar system. In particular, we focus on the unfolding of a system M . Say that a system admits an access control interpretation consistent with a policy , if it can be extended into a system with structured state by adding definitions of O, V , contents, observe and alter in such a way as to satisfy conditions DRM-1 to DRM-6.
Theorem 5.2 Let system M be ta 3 -secure with respect to . Then unfold(M ) admits an access control interpretation consistent with .
If M is ta 2 -secure with respect to , then there exists a local policy ≤ such that unfold(M ) admits an access control interpretation consistent with , that additionally satisfies DRM-5 .
Proof Suppose first that M is ta 3 -secure with respect to . Extend unfold(M ) to a system with structured state by the following definitions:
We will show that the dynamic reference monitor conditions DRM-1 to DRM-6 hold. β) . (We remark that we do not need the antecedents α ≈ u β and α ≈ v β of DRM-5, so we have actually proved something stronger.)
DRM-6:
We prove the contrapositive. Suppose α | u v . Then clearly alter(u,
Next, suppose that M is ta 2 -secure with respect to . By Lemma 5 there exists a local policy ≤ such that M is ta 2 -secure with respect to . By Theorem 3.2, M is ta 3 -secure with respect to . Hence, we may apply the above construction with respect to instead of , to obtain an access control interpretation consistent with . We show that the stronger condition DRM-5 also holds in this case. Let α ≈ u β and α ≈ v β. Then we have ta 3 u (α) ta 3 u (β) and ta 3 v (α) ta 3 v (β), i.e., α ∼ 3 u β and α ∼ 3 v β. We may work with the relations ∼ 3 in the definition of locality, so from locality of , it follows that β) . That is, in either case, we have the desired result.
Theorem 5.2 can be understood as saying that every system that is secure with respect to a local policy could have been constructed using access control mechanisms satisfying the reference monitor conditions, in such a way that its security follows using Theorem 5.1. The phrase "could have been constructed" here is formally interpreted as allowing bisimilar systems as equivalent alternate implementations. Thus, this result states that the reference monitor conditions provide both a sound and complete methodology for the construction of systems that are secure with respect to local policies. This result, and the intuitive nature of the dynamic reference monitor conditions, provides further justification for our definitions.
Example: a capability system
In the operating systems literature, capabilities are a commonly used representation for access control. They provide a conceptual model that allows for dynamic security policies, by allowing an agent possessing a capability to transmit it to another agent, thereby granting the receiver the powers associated with the capability. A number of works on Decentralized Information Flow Control systems [KT09, ML97, VEK + 07, ZBKM06] have proposed capability-based systems as a mechanism for implementing dynamic information flow policies. Some of the proposals in the literature contain covert channels (see, e.g., [KT09] , Section III). In this section, we develop a simplified model that is in the spirit of these proposals, but tailored to be secure with respect to an associated policy. (Our model was motivated by a consideration of Flume [KT09] , but we have taken significant liberties in order to obtain a system that satisfies the desired result. We refer the reader to [KT09] for intuitions and a detailed motivation for the design. We discuss the motivation for our changes to Flume in Sect. 6.4.)
States and observations
We assume a set P of processes, each corresponding to a domain, so D P . There is a fixed set N of basic tag names, from which the set T N ∪ {n p | n ∈ N , p ∈ P } of tags is generated. Here, each tag t ∈ N is a tag that exists at system startup, and n p is a tag that is labelled with the process p that may create it. A security level is represented as a subset of T . A capability is a value of the form either t + or t − , where t is a tag. Intuitively, t + represents the capability to add tag t to a security level, and t − represents the capability to remove tag t from a security level. We write Capabilities for the set of all capabilities.
Each process p has an associated set Objects p Data p ∪ PolicyState p of objects. The set PolicyState p represents process p's component of the policy, and consists of the following special objects, each with an associated type (of possible values for the object)
• S p of type P(T ): the value of this object is a set of tags, and intuitively represents the types of information that process p may receive. The set S p is called the secrecy set of process p, and represents its security level. • O p of type P(Capabilities) the value of this object is a set of capabilities. The set O p is called the capability set of process p, and represents the set of powers that the process has to add and remove tags from its security level.
The set Data p is the set of data objects that are local to process p. We assume that the set Data p contains at least the following:
• m p , an outgoing message buffer, used by p to construct a message prior to its transmission • in p , of type a sequence of messages. This is the input buffer through which p receives messages from other processes.
A state is a function s assigning a value of the appropriate type to each object in p∈P Objects p . We write S for the set of states. A candidate initial state is a state s such that for all processes p, we have O p ⊆ {n x | n ∈ N , x ∈ {+, −}} and S p ⊆ N . That is, in an initial state, only basic tags exist; tags local to a process need to be created as the system runs. We allow the initial state of a system to be any candidate initial state: different choices of initial state correspond to different initial configurations of the security policy.
The observation functions of a capability system may be defined as any functions that satisfy the following constraint, for each process p and all states s and t:
Obs. If s Objects p t Objects p then obs p (s) obs p (t).
That is, observations depend, for each process, only on its own objects.
Given the intuition that the set S p represents the types of information that process p may receive, if S p contains a tag t then p may have received information of type t. If t is not in S q for some other process q, then there is a risk that if p transfers information to q then q will obtain information of type t, which is prohibited. This suggests that with each state s, we may naturally associate a static policy , such that p q iff S p (s) ⊆ S q (s). In what follows, it is convenient to write s | S p ⊆ S q when s(S p ) ⊆ s(S q ).
Actions and transitions
The following actions are possible in the system. There is a flexible set of "data actions" as well as a collection of concrete actions that manipulate capabilities and send messages. We write actions in the format p.a, where p ∈ P is a process, and define the domain of action p.a to be dom(p.a) p.
Data actions p.a
We assume that p has some set of data manipulating actions that act on its data objects. This set of actions can be instantiated in any way, subject to the constraint that these actions read only the local state of the process and write only the data objects of the process. More precisely, for any data action p.a, we assume the following, for all states s and t: Constraint Data1 says that data actions of process p change only p's data objects, and no others. Constraint Data2 says that the way that such an action changes p's data objects depends only on the value of p's data and policy state objects. That is, a data action p.a is deterministic and may read only objects in Objects p and write only objects in Data p . (If the tag already exists, the operation may be used to add capabilities to the existing ones.) Note that the fact that the tag created is indexed by the process p means that two distinct processes cannot create a tag with the same name. This action adds a tag to the secrecy set of the process, provided it has the capability to do so. Because the policy at a state depends on the secrecy sets, a consequence of this is that some outgoing edges from p may be removed from the policy, and some ingoing edges may be added.
This action removes a tag from the secrecy set of the process, provided it has the capability to do so, and consequently might add outgoing policy edges from p or insert incoming edges. Intuitively, by removing the tag, p enables declassification of information of type p; whereas it may have received information of type t, the policy is no longer constrained to restrict p from communicating with processes that are not permitted to receive information of type t. p.send message to(q) where q is a process, with code
This action transmits the message in the message object m p to q by adding it to the end of q s input buffer in p , provided the policy permits transmission of information from p to q (i.e., S p ⊆ S q ). The action has no effect on the policy, even if the message contains information about p's tags and/or capabilities. Intuitively, we assume that the operating system is responsible for maintaining the policy state, and mere knowledge of a capability name or value does not suffice to be able to exercise the capability. In order to transmit the ability to exercise capabilities, the following action needs to be used. This action transmits the capability c to q, provided both that p is permitted to transmit information to q (i.e., S p ⊆ S q ) and p actually possesses the capability (i.e., c ∈ O p ). The effect of this action may be to remove outgoing edges from q or add incoming edges to q.
Security of the capability model
We now establish the security of any capability system constructed as described above. Note that there are multiple such systems, since the description above leaves open the choice of processes, basic tag names, data objects, data actions, initial state and observation functions. It also remains to specify a dynamic security policy. Given a capability system M with actions A and processes P , and initial state s 0 , we say that the associated policy is the policy M defined by α | p M q when s 0 · α | S p ⊆ S q . The following states that a capability system is secure with respect to the associated security policy. Theorem 6.1 Let M be a capability system. Then the associated policy M is local, and the system M is both ta 3 -secure and ta 2 -secure with respect to M .
Proof We show that M admits an access control interpretation consistent with M and apply Theorem 5.1.
For the set of objects of the access control interpretation, we take O ∪ p∈P Objects p ∪ {oset(p)}. (Since both the access control model and the capability model use a notion of object, and these are not quite the same when relating the two models, the reader needs to bear in mind that O refers to the objects in the acccess control model and Objects refers to objects in the capability model.) We define the access control functions for states s and processes p by observe(p, s) Objects p ∪{oset(p)} and alter(p, s) . In the case of a p.send message to(q) and p.send cap(c, q), we have from o ∈ alter(dom(a), s) that o is not one of the two possible objects in q and O q whose values these actions can change, so again, these actions do not change the value of o. DRM-4: This is immediate from the fact that the value of observe(s, p) is a constant. DRM-5 : Suppose s ≈ p t and s ≈ q t. We need to show that alter(p, s) ∩ observe(q, s) alter(p, t) ∩ observe(q, t). Now observe(q, s) is a constant, and if p q then alter(p, s) Objects p is also a constant, so we need only consider the case p q. In this case, alter(p, s) ∩ observe(q, s) is {in q , O q } if s | S p ⊆ S q and is ∅ otherwise. From s ≈ p t and s ≈ q t we get that s(S p ) t(S p ) and s(S q ) t(S q ), so s | S p ⊆ S q iff t | S p ⊆ S q . Thus, alter(p, s) ∩ observe(q, s) alter(p, t) ∩ observe(q, t). DRM-6: Note that for p q, the sets Objects p and Objects q are disjoint. It follows that if alter(p, s 0 · α) ∩ observe(q, s 0 · α) ∅, then we have either p q or s 0 · α | S p ⊆ S q . In either case, we have
It follows from Theorem 6.1 that a capability system is secure with respect to any policy that is no more restrictive than the associated policy.
Corollary 1 Let M be a capability system. Then for any dynamic security policy with M ≤ , the system M is both ta 3 -secure and ta 2 -secure with respect to .
Proof Immediate from Theorem 6.1 using Propositions 2 and 3.
Comments on flume
The capability system described above is somewhat motivated by Flume [KT09] , but differs in a number of respects. We comment here on the differences. First, Flume associates both a secrecy set S p ⊆ T and an integrity set I p ⊆ T to each agent p. These operate dually, so we have avoided inclusion of the integrity set just for simplicity. Our formulation could be extended to include it.
Next, Flume permits transmission of information from p to q when S p \D p ⊆ S q ∪ D q , where D u is the set of tags for which u possesses both the capability to add and remove the tag. The intuition for this definition is that if p wishes to transmit information to q, but is constrained from doing so because S p contains a tag t that is not in S q , then this obstacle would be overcome if p is able to remove the tag from S p or if q is able to add the tag to S q . Assuming no other obstacles, the transmission could then proceed. Moreover, if, correspondingly, p is also able to add the tag or q is able to remove it, then after the transmission, the policy could be restored to its original state. Thus, the condition S p \D p ⊆ S q ∪ D q captures the situations where this sequence of moves would allow transmission from p to q while leaving the policy state unchanged after the transmission is complete. The thinking then is that since such a sequence of moves cannot be prevented, the policy may as well allow the transmission directly.
We are not convinced that this is a good idea. One reason for p to have a tag in D p but not in S p might be that p wishes to protect itself against inadvertent transmission of information to q. Mechanisms such as sudo and the discretionary access controls on a user's own objects in Unix are explicitly designed to disable the effects of actions that the user nevertheless has the capacity to enable, and it seems useful to have a similar discretionary layer of control for information flow policies. So we have not followed Flume in adopting this modification of the basic policy.
The Flume model includes a setÔ of global capabilities, that are implicitly owned by all domains. That is, Flume works with the sets of owned capabilities O p O p ∪Ô. When creating a tag, an agent is able to place the associated capabilities intoÔ. The motivation for this appears to be the following ([KT09], section II.D):
The most important policy in Flume is export protection, wherein untrustworthy processes can compute with secret data without the ability to reveal it. An export protection tag is a tag t such that t + ∈Ô and t − ∈Ô. For a process p to achieve such a result, it creates a new tag t and grants t + to the global setÔ, while closely guarding t − . To protect a file f , p creates the file with secrecy label {t}. If a process q wishes to read f , it must first add t to S q , which it can do since t + ∈Ô ⊆ O q . Now, q can only send messages to other processes with t in their labels. It requires p's authorization to remove t from its label or send data to the network.
We have not followed Flume in including the set of global capabilities O. One reason is that we find the above argument unconvincing. Once t + is inÔ, not just q, but any other agent r may add t to its secrecy set, and any protection afforded by tag t is then eliminated. The main reason that Krohn and Tromer have in mind that r might not be able to add t to its secrecy set is that t is randomly generated, and r does not know the appropriate value to use, making it a low probability event that r should add t unless it somehow receives t + in a chain of transmission from p. But in that case, we may as well rely upon the direct transmission of t + to the set O r as the enabler for r 's adding t to its secrecy set. There does not appear to be any necessary role forÔ in the above argument.
Another reason for not following Flume in the inclusion of the global setÔ is that it causes a covert channel. An agent p may choose to add a capability t to O, and any other agent q can test whether the capability t is in O or not. This causes a flow of information from p to q. Krohn and Tromer are aware of this covert channel and seek to mitigate it by randomizing tag names. However this means that they require a much more complicated probabilistic version of noninterference semantics. It is not clear to us whether their semantics is well-formulated, since some subtle points appear to have been overlooked. Note that their systems have both probabilistic transitions (random generation of tag names) and nondeterministic transitions (agent's choice of their actions). This means that there is not a straightforward probability distribution on runs. How to handle the mix of probability and nondeterminism is an issue that has been studied in the literature, and involves a number of subtleties [HSM97, Che06] . It does not appear that Krohn and Tromer are aware of these issues, indeed, they do not even define the probability space that they use. It would seem that, at the very least, some non-trivial further details are needed to make their result fully precise, which we will not pursue here.
Finally, Flume allows for dynamic creation of processes by means of a forking operation. It uses this to represent newly created objects as processes. Our policy model assumes a fixed set of domains, so this aspect of Flume cannot be directly represented. It would be interesting to develop an extension of our framework with the expressiveness to encompass creation of objects and agents.
Related work
Related work using an automaton-based semantics similar to the one we have used in the paper has already been discussed in detail in Sect. 3.6. We focus here on work in the context of programming language security that has considered dynamic information flow policies. A recent survey of dynamic policies in the context of programming languages is [BvDS15] . They attempt to develop a classification based on various "facets" that are factored into the wide spectrum of definitions of security in this area. In general, there exist nontrivial gaps between the semantic frameworks used in this literature and our semantic model. Even within the programming language literature, formal relationships between the various semantics studied are rarely presented. We therefore give only some informal comparisons with our work.
One of the facets discussed in [BvDS15] is the distinction between "whitelisting flows" and "blacklisting flows", which is similar to our distinction between a permissive and a prohibitive reading of policies. Interestingly, the whitelisting/permissive reading is claimed to be the norm in the programming language security literature.
However, there are also significant points of difference. Generally these works concern a programming language framework in which the secrets to be concealed are already encoded into the initial state, rather than our "interactive" model in which secrets are generated on the fly as the result of nondeterministic choices of action made by the agents. Frequently, the programming languages studied are deterministic, so a direct relationship to our setting is not immediately clear. There exists an approach by Clarke and Hunt [CH08] to handling interactivity in a programming language setting by including stream variables in the initial state to represent the sequence of future inputs that will be selected by an agent over the course of the run. However, this, in effect, assumes that the scheduler also is deterministic. Adding a variable for the schedule and allowing other agents to learn the complete schedule would be more permissive than a definition such as TA-security, since this restricts the information that agents may learn about the schedule. It therefore seems that establishing an exact correspondence would require some detailed work.
Another significant point of difference is that in the programming language literature, the policy and the system model (program) are often tightly intertwined, whereas we have a separate policy and system model, just as a specification and implementation are usually considered distinct. Other works that do allow for such a separation include Morgan [Mor09] , which develops a refinement calculus that allows for mixtures of information flow specifications and code, enabling an implementation to be derived from a specification via steps that mix the two, and Delft et. al. [vDHS15] , which develops a type theory for dynamic information flow that operates on a program separately from the dynamic policy.
One of the ways that intransitivity is handled in the programming language setting also involves a dynamic aspect to policies: special constructs are introduced that allow temporary violations of a static policy, either through use of special basic actions or the establishment of a program region within which an alternate policy is enforced. A survey of work in this area is [SS09] . For example, Mantel and Sands [MS04] work with a classical transitive security policy, but add downgrading commands that may violate this policy (subject to some alternate constraints.) They give a security definition that uses a specially defined bisimulation relation.
Broberg and Sands [BS06, BS09] define flow locks, which enable variables to be typed with conditional annotations that constrain the security levels to which contents of these variables may flow. The values referred to in the conditions may be altered during the execution of the program, thereby making the policy dynamic. The authors give a complex bisimulation-based semantics to these policies [BS06] , but in later work [BS09] prefer an alternate knowledge-based semantics, with a perfect recall interpretation of knowledge. It appears that their definitions are closer to those for a classical purge-based definition than to our intransitive policies. To capture a downgrader policy H D L, such as to allow information from H to reach L via D, it seems necessary to temporarily change the policy to effectively add an edge H L to the policy, allowing a direct flow from H to L. This is not in the spirit of intransitive noninterference, which intends to capture that all flows from H to L must pass through D.
Chong and Myers [CM04] propose to handle declassification violations of transitive policy using a notion of noninterference until declassification which applies a classical noninterference definition on runs just up to the point where a sequence of events has occurred on the basis of which the policy permits a declassification of secret information to the domain under consideration. Beyond this point, the definition does not constrain the behaviour of the system. Hicks et al [HTHZ05] refine this idea to impose constraints on longer runs, declaring these secure if they consist of a sequence of policy-update free fragments, each of which satisfies the standard noninterference condition. This extension is also applied by Swamy et al [SHTZ06] , who develop a language with dynamic role-based information flow policies. This approach is also similar to the approach used by Almeida-Matos and Boudol [MB09] , who work in a language-based setting where a transitive policy can temporarily be extended by addition of new edges (yielding another transitive policy). Their security condition states, using a bisimulation, that each transition in an execution is secure with respect to the transitive policy in place at the time the transition is taken. Askarov and Sabelfeld [AS07] develop an approach to declassification based on an operational semantics that tracks what information from the initial state has been released by declassification commands, and uses this to define a bisimulation that checks that no more H information is known at termination of program than has been explicitly declassified. Banerjee et al [BNR08] develop a more fine-grained approach that allows policies that express of each program step what information may be declassified. It would seem that these approaches generally do not handle covert channels resulting from the policy changes themselves, as illustrated in our Example 1 -we leave this question for a later investigation.
All of the above approaches, like ours in this paper, work with perfect recall definitions of attacker knowledge. Askarov and Chong [AC12] point to an interesting issue with respect to dynamic security policies, which is that events may transmit "old news": information that would have been allowed to be transmitted to an attacker according to an earlier state of the security policy, but was actually not transmitted. The current state of the policy may prohibit the flow of this information. In this case, security definitions that are based on a perfect recall model of attacker knowledge, fail to identify such transmissions of "old news" as violations of security.
In response to this observation, Askarov and Chong propose to work with attackers that are weaker than the perfect recall attacker. They define a notion of knowledge for such attackers, and state definitions of security that require that any new knowledge gained by an attacker at security level (domain) u should only concern security levels v such that v u according to the security policy at the time of the event. They identify some potential weaker attackers, but do not identify a definitive set of attackers; since the attacker is a parameter of their proposed security definition one could view the set of attackers against which a system should be secure as a matter of policy.
One of the attackers considered by Askarov and Chong is the perfect recall attacker, and here it is reasonable to attempt to compare their framework to ours. Unfortunately, making such a comparison formally is not completely straightforward because their semantic setting is somewhat different from ours: whereas in our framework there are multiple causal agents (the domains), who are free to choose any action at any time, in theirs there is a single causal agent (a deterministic program) that reads and writes information from different security domains. However, there is one respect where a clear difference of intent is apparent in their intuitions and definitions.
Consider a situation with domains D {A, B , C , P }. Let be the policy {u u | u ∈ D} ∪ {P u | u ∈ D}. Intuitively, P here is the policy authority, and states that all domains are permitted to know the state of the policy. In the initial state of the system, take the policy to be ∪ {A B }. Any actions performed by A are, intuitively, permitted by this policy to be recorded in the state of B , but should remain unknown to C . Suppose that after some actions by A, the policy agent changes the policy to ∪ {B C }. Now, B is permitted to communicate with C . According to our intuitions and formal definitions, B may now send to C the information it has about the actions that A performed before the policy change. Such flows from A to C via B are typical of the flows that intransitive policies are intended to permit [HY87] .
However, according to Askarov and Chong's definitions (both for the perfect recall attacker and weaker attackers), if an action now copies this information from B 's state and it is observed by C , this is a violation of security, because in a transition where it makes the observation, C learns new information about A, whereas the current state of the policy prohibits it from doing so. Thus, although Askarov and Chong permit intransitive policies, we would argue that their definitions do not handle dynamic intransitivity in a way that fits our intuitions: their semantics can best be characterized as a dynamic version of the classical purge-based definition of security, rather than a dynamic version of a semantics for intransitive noninterference. The details of Askarov and Chong's semantics are refined in [vDHS15] , but similar remarks apply to to this work.
Conclusion
We have developed two generalizations for intransitive dynamic policies of the notion of TA-security that has recently been argued to provide a better semantics for static policies. One is based on a permissive reading of policy edges, the other on a prohibitive reading of policy edges. Under the natural condition of locality, the two readings are equivalent. We have also provided proof theory for these notions in the form of unwinding conditions and a sound and complete policy enforcement method using access control. Finally, we have demonstrated the applicability of the theory by applying it to establish security for a natural capability model.
Several interesting directions remain open for further investigation. One concerns the circularity in the justification of ta 2 -security. While ta 2 -security is, as we have shown, self-consistent, there may be further natural constraints that also lead to self-consistent notions of security. For example, one candidate is to require for information transfer that the sender know that there is an edge from it to the receiver, in place of the assumption we made in ta 2 -security that the sender and receiver must jointly know that there is such an edge. Whether such a constraint should apply is arguably a matter of policy. This suggests that there may be a case for a policy language that more explicitly provides a way to express conditions on agent knowledge. It would also be of interest to develop algorithms for verifying whether a system satisfies a policy. Both models and dynamic policies as we have defined them are highly expressive, so this would require some restrictions: finite state models and policies that are representable using finite state automata would be one interesting starting point: it remains to be shown that this case is decidable.
We have shown that while ta 3 -security is more expressive than ta 2 -security, the difference between these notions applies only in the case of non-local policies. Both are associated with natural intuitions, but we leave open the question of whether the extra expressiveness of ta 3 -security is necessary in practice, i.e., whether there are any interesting systems requiring non-local policies where ta 3 -security, rather than ta 2 -security, is the appropriate notion of security. The main realistic example we have presented, the capability system of Sect. 6 involves a local policy, so it does not resolve this question. The notion of ta 3 -security allows information flows relating to policy settings that are not explicitly represented as edges in the policy itself. Conceivably, a richer policy format may allow these implicit flows to be more explicitly represented.
It would also be interesting to formally relate our work to work in the programming language setting, and to combine the insights from Askarov and Chong's work on imperfect recall attackers with the approach we have developed in the present paper.
